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NOTES AND COMMENTS
than an additional factor to be noted. On the other hand, Rule 2, which
allows the motorist to proceed uninterruptedly into the intersection and
make his observation while in progress, operates effectively as to both
purposes. Crossings are rendered less dangerous and the flow of
traffic is facilitated.
WILLIAm H. HOLDFORD
Workmen's Compensation-Analysis of "Jurisdictional Fact"
Review by Superior Courts
The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act empowers the
Industrial Commission to make findings of fact which are binding on the
parties and on courts on appeal. Appeals from rulings of the Com-
mission may be taken only "for errors of law, under the same terms and
conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions."1
Cases in North Carolina reveal two lines of authority concerning
the extent to which findings by the Industrial Commission may be re-
viewed on appeal to the superior court. One group2 of cases shows
literal adherence to the language of the act in holding that the courts
may review only questions of law. The other group3 departs from the
literal language of the act and asserts that the superior court judge may
not only review questions of law, but that he may also make his own
findings of "jurisdictional fact"4 upon motion of the appellant.
I N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (1958) provides that the award of the Commission
"shall be conclusive and binding as'to all questions of fact; but either party to the
dispute may... appeal from the decision of said Commission to the superior court
... for errors of law, under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in
ordinary civil actions... ." (Emphasis added.)2 Hawes v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 243 N.C. 62, 89 S.E.2d 739
(1955); Thomason v. Red Bird Cab Co., 235 N.C. 602, 70 S.E.2d 706 (1952);
Smith v. Southern Waste Paper Co., 226 N.C. 47, 36 S.E.2d 730 (1946) ; Hayes v.
Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137 (1944) ; Bivens v. Teer, 220 N.C. 135,
16 S.E.2d 659 (1941); Beach v. McLean, 219 N.C. 521, 14 S.E.2d 515 (1941);
Birchfield v. Department of Conservation and Development, 204 N.C. 217, 167 S.E.
855 (1933).
Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 92 S.E.2d 673 (1956) ; Aylor v.
Barnes, 242 N.C. 223, 87 S.E.2d 269 (1955); Francis v. Carolina Wood Turning
Co., 204 N.C. 701, 169 S.E. 654 (1933) ; Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N.C. 500, 505, 163
S.E. 569, 571 (1932) (dictum).
'"[I]n every proceeding of a judicial nature, there are one or more facts which
are strictly jurisdictional, the existence of which is necessary to the validity of the
proceedings, and without which the act of the court is a mere nullity .... " Nobel v.
Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 173 (1893).
Professor Larson has said that practically every fact decided in compensation
cases has some bearing on the tribunal's jurisdiction and that reduced to the absurd,
the rule could be used to render the tribunal powerless to decide any question with
finality. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 80.41 (1952).
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, has termed only three issues
questions of "jurisdictional fact": (1). Was the injured worker an employee?
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1958); Francis v. Carolina: Wood Turning Co.,
stepra note 3; (2) Does the defendant regularly work five or more employees?
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(b) (1958); Aycock v. Cooper, supra note 3; (3) If
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The existence of these two lines of authority raises several questions.
First, in what circumstances have the two approaches been used?
Second, is the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine necessary? Third, why
has the "jurisdictional fact" approach been used? It is the purpose of
this note to explore the questions presented by these two divergent views.
Aycock v. Cooper5 is the earliest reported case in which the Industrial
Commission's jurisdiction was challenged in a workmen's compensation
case. The superior court was upheld in reversing an award of the full
Commission because there was no competent evidence to support the
"jurisdictional fact" that there were five employees. In dictum6 the
court said that had there been competent evidence on this point, a
proper construction of G.S. § 97-86 would have justified a redetermina-
tion of this "jurisdictional fact" by the superior court. It was conceded
that all other facts are binding on appeal.
The Aycock dictum was followed in Francis v. Carolina Wood Turn-
ing Co.7 where the superior court was upheld in making an independent
finding, from conflicting evidence, of the "jurisdictional fact" of em-
ployment and in setting aside the Commission's finding that plaintiff
was an independent contractor.
8
Until 1955 the Aycock and Francis decisions, although cited in
several dicta,9 were not reaffirmed. For a time the court seemed to deal
with jurisdictional matters as questions of law only. An example of
this approach is found in Beach v. McLean.1° In that case the jurisdic-
tional question was whether claimant was the employee of the appellant
or of an independent contractor who was not subject to the act. The
Commission's finding, from undisputed facts, that the appellant was
claimant's employer was reversed by the superior court. In affirming
the lower court's decision the court described the question of employ-
ment as a mixed one of law and fact. The contractual elements found
to exist by the Commission were conclusive fact findings, but the relation-
ship evidenced by those facts was treated as a reviewable question of law.
the injury occurred out of the state, are the place the employment contract was
made, the place of business of the employer, and the residence of the employee all
in North Carolina? N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-36 (1958) ; Aylor v. Barnes, supra note
3.
The court has held that whether there was an injury resulting from an accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment is conclusive as found by the
Commission, if supported by competent evidence, and is not a reviewable "juris-
dictional fact." Francis v. Carolina Wood Turning Co., supra.
6202 N.C. 500, 163 S.E. 569 (1932).
OId. at 505, 163 S.E. at 571.
7204 N.C. 701, 169 S.E. 654 (1933).
B See note 17 infra.
Mallard v. F. M. Bohannon, Inc., 220 N.C. 536, 542, 18 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1941);
Buchanan v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 217 N.C. 173, 175, 7 S.E.2d
382, 383 (1940) ; Thompson v. Johnson Funeral Home, 208 N.C. 178, 180, 179 S.E.
801, 803 (1935).10219 N.C. 521, 14 S.E.2d 515 (1941).
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In Smith v. Southern Waste Paper Co.,'" as in the Beach case,
there was no dispute as to the facts. The superior court reversed the
Commission's finding that claimant's deceased was an employee. The
supreme court reversed, calling such a jurisdictional issue a reviewable
question of law, but holding that where, as here, there is competent
evidence to support the findings and conclusion of the Commission the
award should be affirmed. This opinion seems to go further than any
other in the direction of a liberal attitude toward the finality of Com-
mission decisions. Although this case apparently stands for the prop-
osition that the Commission's conclusions of law will be upheld it
supported by competent evidence, the court in subsequent cases has no-,
so interpreted it. On the contrary, it has been accepted along with
Beach, a question of law case, as authoritative on the question of the
scope of the courts' review powers in cases where the jurisdiction of the
Commission was in issue. In Aylor v. Barnes,'2 however, the court
reaffirmed the "jurisdictional fact" rule of the Aycock and Francis
cases. The lower court affirmed the Commission's assumption of juris-
diction and award to the claimant and rejected appellant's argument for
non-coverage based on allegations that claimant was a non-resident and
that the injury occurred outside the state. On appeal, the superior court
was reversed for failure to make an independent finding of the disputed
"jurisdictional fact" of residence.
In Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., '3 plaintiff, in a hearing be-
fore the Industrial Commission, attacked that body's jurisdiction to en-
force a settlement agreement into which he had entered with defendant-
employer on the ground that he was not an employee. The superior
court, upon its independent finding of the disputed question of employ-
ment, affirmed the Commission's finding of no jurisdiction. The supreme
court approved, invoking the "jurisdictional fact" rule, even though
at times it labeled the employment question one of law. The case, how-
ever, was reversed on other grounds.
Shortly after the decision in the Hart case the fact that two lines of
authority exist with regard to jurisdictional review was recognized for
the first time by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the case of
Pearson v. Peerless Flooring Co.'4 Defendant had appealed from an
award to a worker's widow alleging that deceased was an independent
contractor and not an employee as found by the Commission. Defendant
assigned as error the failure of the judge below to make an independent
finding of this "jurisdictional fact." The supreme court found, however,
that such a finding had in fact been made. Since the superior court's
-1 226 N.C. 47, 36 S.E.2d 730 (1946).
12242 N.C. 223, 87 S.E.2d 269 (1955).
.-3 244 N.C. 84, 92 S.E.2d 673 (1956).
,247 N.C. 434, 101 S.E.2d 301 (1958).
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finding was the same as that of the Commission, as was the case in the
Hart decision, the court did not have to adopt or reject either of the two
lines of authority. The court did call attention to the conflict and
noted that a considerable period followed the Aycock and Francis
decisions during which the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine of those cases
was not invoked. It was also pointed out by the court that when the
doctrine was again used in the Hart and Aylor decisions it was not
re-examined for its soundness.
An attempt to classify the situations in which the two approaches have
been used yields the following generalities. First, the "jurisdictional
fact" approach is taken where there is conflicting evidence as to basic
facts upon which the ultimate conclusion as to jurisdiction turns.
Second, the doctrine generally has gone unmentioned when there is no
dispute as to the evidentiary facts.
What difference, if any, exists between a finding of "jurisdictional
fact" and a legal conclusion regarding a circumstance on which a tri-
bunal's jurisdiction depends? Where there is an agreed statement of facts
the only possible issues for judicial determination are questions of law.1'
Likewise it seems that when a-tribunal has the power to find basic or
evidentiary facts conclusively,16 that the ultimate or "jurisdictional fact"
of employment, number employed, or place of residence of the worker,
would be but a legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts.
Had the superior courts' power of review been expressly limited by
the supreme court to questions of law, all of the cases discussed could
have been decided as they were with the exception of the Francis
case.17 The court has, on occasion, substantiated this assertion by
citing, without distinction, cases which adopt both views.' 8
Why has appellate court redetermination of "jurisdictional facts"
been permitted? Professor Larson has offered the following explana-
tion: "The statute gives the administrative agency power to make
decisions with reference only to certain situations; an agency with
delegated powers may not enlarge those powers beyond the statutory
5Thomas v. Raleigh Gas Co., 218 N.C. 429, 11 S.E.2d 297 (1940).
1 See note 1 supra.
'7 The Francis case stands out as a decision that seems to be irreconcilable with
a "question of law" approach to review. The superior court judge was allowed to
redetermine, from the conflicting evidence in the record, evidentiary facts bearing
on the question of employment. The Commission called plaintiff, wh9 worked at
a table in defendant's shop, an independent contractor. The court sustained the
lower court's independent finding that he was an employee. Perhaps the court
in the Francis case stretched the "jurisdictional fact" rule to reach the result
they -felt justice demanded.
18 The Aylor and Hart decisions ("jurisdictional fact" cases) cite Smith v.
Southern Waste Paper Co. (a "question of law" case) as authority for the review
of "jurisdictional facts." The Smith case states that jurisdiction is reviewable as
a question of law and cites Aycock v. Cooper (the original "jurisdictional fact" case)
as authority for this proposition.
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grant by its own act; it therefore cannot be allowed to make conclusive
findings of the very facts on which the scope of its power and jurisdic-
tion depends. Therefore the reviewing court must decide for itself
whether the facts on which jurisdiction rests actually existed."19
In the dictum of Aycock v. Cooper it was stated that both a "proper
construction" of the statute20 and "well-settled principles of law" re-
quire a redetermination of the "jurisdictional facts" by the superior
court on appeal. The court did not explain the construction or the
principles upon which it relied in asserting the requirement of such
review.2 1
It might be argued that the statutory wording, "under the same terms
and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions," justifies a
holding that "jurisdictional facts" are reviewable. The quoted words
have been held to make appeals from the Commission analogous to those
from justices of the peace.22 The superior court has appellate jurisdic-
tion of all issues of law or fact determined by a justice of the peace.23
The court later limited the justice of the peace analogy to the mechanics
of appeal, i.e., procedures for docketing and notice of appeal.24 This
holding seems to preclude justification of "jurisdictional fact" review-
of the type seen in the Francis case-on the basis of this analogy.
In ordinary civil actions beginning in the superior court where the
judge has found a "jurisdictional fact," such as domicile, his determina-
tion will be held conclusive on appeal if there is any competent evidence
to support the finding.25 This is true regardless of the conclusion that
the supreme court might have reached upon the same evidence.26 It
seems that the court has attached less significance to the findings of
"jurisdictional fact" by the Industrial Commission.
Perhaps the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine sprang from a desire on the
part of the court to vest in the judiciary a greater amount of control
over the scope and coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
This control would naturally be exercised by reversals of the Com-
mission's finding or non-finding of "jurisdictional facts." Yet in only
one case 27 has the supreme court upheld a superior court reversal of
the Commission by invoking the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine.
112 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 4.
20 See note 1 supra.
2 Connor, J., speaking for the court, expressed the opinion that a failure to
recognize the review power over "jurisdictional facts" might raise a serious con-
stitutional question as to the validity of the statute that is now G.S. § 97-86. 202
N.C. at 505, 163 S.E. at 571.
Higdon v. Nantahala Power and Light Co., 207 N.C. 39, 175 S.E. 710 (1934)..
'
3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-66 (1953).
2 Fox v. Cramerton Mills, Inc., 225 N.C. 580, 35 S.E.2d 869 (1945).
:'Bangle v. Webb, 220 N.C. 423, 17 S.E.2d 613 (1941).
8Ibid.
27 See note 17 supra.
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Although the "jurisdictional fact" rule if greatly extended would tend
to deprive the Commission of its ability to perform its duty effectively
and reduce its proceedings to "meaningless preliminary skirmishes,128
the rule has not, as yet, reduced the effectiveness of the Commission in
settling compensation claims in North Carolina. The rule has, however,
given rise to confusion in federal compensation cases and has been the
topic of several well-reasoned dissenting opinions. 29 In addition, a
recent treatise on workmen's compensation states that the rule has
been "largely discredited."30
Another objectionable feature of the rule that "jurisdictional facts"
are excepted from the binding facts found by the Commission is that
the superior court, without seeing any witnesses or hearing any testi-
mony, may go into the record and determine for itself not just the
"jurisdictional fact" but also the basic facts which, considered together,
afford a basis for determination of the "jurisdictional fact."3' This
practice seems not to be justified by G.S. § 97-86.
The return of the "jurisdictional fact" rule in the Aylor and Hart
cases could indicate a desire on the part of the court to revest in the
judiciary a measure of control seemingly disclaimed in the Beach and
Smith cases. A more likely reason for the return of the rule is that
mentioned in the Pearson case, namely, that the court apparently ap-
282 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 4.
" In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), the United States Supreme Court
held that administrative findings of fact as to the employment relationship and the
location of the accident were "jurisdictional facts" which could be determined anew
upon appeal to the district court under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act. Speaking for a three-justice minority, Mr. Justice Brandeis
criticized the majority opinion by saying: "Whatever may be the propriety of a
rule permitting special re-examination in a trial court of so-called 'jurisdictional
facts' passed upon by administrative bodies having otherwise final jurisdiction over
matters properly committed to them, I find no warrant for extending the doctrine
to other and different administrative tribunals whose very function is to hear
evidence and make initial determinations concerning those matters which it is sought
to re-examine .... Logically applied it would seriously impair the entire adminis-
trative process." Id. at 92, 93. In this case the review provisions of the com-
pensation act in question were similar to those of G.S. § 97-86. See note 1 supra.
In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), where appellant sought to have
a judicial redetermination of "jurisdictional facts" foujid by a draft board, in his
concurring opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "This argument revives, if
indeed it does not multiply, all the casuistic difficulties spawned by the doctrine
of 'jurisdictional fact.' In view of the criticism which that doctrine, as sponsored
by Crowell v. Benson,.. . brought forth and of the attritions of that case through
later decisions, one had supposed that the doctrine had earned a deserved repose."
Id. at 142.
Although the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine has been widely criticized both by
members of the United States Supreme Court and legal writers, and later decisions
have failed to extend the rule of the Crowell case even to similar situations, it has
never been specifically overruled. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, 133
(1938). See Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U.S. 162 (1933); Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 695
(1944); Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. Brown, 81 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1947).
202 LARSON, Op. cit. supra note 4.
"See note 17 supra.
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plied the rule of the Aycock and Francis cases without a reappraisal of
its soundness.
When a proper case comes before the court, the suggested reappraisal
should be made and the "jurisdictional fact" rule should be abandoned
in North Carolina. This abandonment is suggested not because the rule
has led to abuse by the courts, but in the interest of lending consistency
to legal terminology. There appears to be little need for perpetuating
two phrases to express the same idea and to accomplish the same legal
purpose. If the motivation for adopting the rule was the desire to
exercise greater control over the policy of the act, past experience does
not show that it has been necessary. If no such motive was present, then
there is no apparent need for using the two phrases interchangeably.
It is felt that abandonment of the term "jurisdictional fact" would not
require the court to relinquish any control over compensation policy
which it may have exercised in the past; and certainly, such a course
would lend greater clarity to this area of the law.
ROBERT L. LINDSEY
